NGINX CVE-2026-123007: An HTTP/2 RCE Back to 1.9.5. Patch to 1.30.7, and Retired ingress-nginx Gets No Fix
F5 fixed five NGINX memory-safety bugs on November 18, led by an HTTP/2 flow-control overflow present since 2015. Fixed versions, a config check that tells you which bugs you can reach, and what to do about ingress-nginx, which bundles a vulnerable NGINX and will never ship a patch.
Key takeaways
- On November 18, 2026, NGINX 1.30.7 and 1.31.9 fixed CVE-2026-123007, an HTTP/2 flow-control overflow in every release since 1.9.5, plus four use-after-free bugs.
- Rapid7 demonstrated remote code execution.
- Upgrade, or set http2 off until you can.
- The archived Kubernetes ingress-nginx controller bundles NGINX 1.27.1 and will get no fix.
On this page
Upgrade NGINX to 1.30.7 (stable) or 1.31.9 (mainline), internet-facing HTTP/2 listeners first. CVE-2026-123007 is a heap overflow in HTTP/2 flow control, present since 1.9.5, and Rapid7 has shown code execution with it. Until you patch, http2 off; blocks it. If you run the retired ingress-nginx controller, no fixed release is coming.
Verified against
Affected and fixed versions against the nginx.org security advisories and the 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 changelogs, Rapid7's disclosure, CERT-EU advisory 2026-022, the ingress-nginx repository and retirement notice, and the NGINX Ingress Controller v5.8.0 and NGINX Gateway Fabric v2.9.0 sources. Checked November 19, 2026.
What happened, in dates
- November 11, 2026: Rapid7 contacts F5 about the HTTP/2 bug. On November 16, F5 confirms the bug, the CVE assignment and a November 18 disclosure date.
- November 18: nginx.org publishes 1.31.9 (ten security fixes) and 1.30.7 (nine). F5 discloses the batch and CERT-EU issues advisory 2026-022, rating each of the five headline bugs CVSS 8.1 and noting no exploitation in the wild yet. Xint, which nginx.org credits for four of them, calls the set nginx2root.
- November 18-19: Docker Hub's official
nginx:1.31.9andnginx:1.30.7tags are published. - As of November 19: none of the five CVEs is in CISA's KEV catalog.
Rapid7 scores CVE-2026-123007 at CVSS 4.0 9.2 and explains the mechanism. A client cancels queued response data until the connection's send window passes the HTTP/2 maximum of 2^31-1. An unsigned subtraction then wraps, and the resulting huge length drives out-of-bounds memcpy reads and writes in the worker. Its proof of concept got unauthenticated code execution against the nginx 1.31.8 Docker image, with worker privileges, not root.
Five bugs, five different preconditions
The batch is easy to over- or under-read, because each bug needs something different in your config. The headline five, from nginx.org and CERT-EU:
| CVE | What it is | You are exposed if | Vulnerable from |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-123007 | HTTP/2 flow-control overflow | Any listener has HTTP/2 enabled | 1.9.5 |
| CVE-2026-123633 | HTTP/2 use-after-free | HTTP/2 plus proxying to an upstream, when worker_connections run out | 1.19.7 |
| CVE-2026-121810 | HTTP/3 use-after-free | HTTP/3 (QUIC) plus proxying, when worker_connections run out | 1.25.0 |
| CVE-2026-123634 | Resolver use-after-free | resolver set, proxy_pass built from request data, and mirror with mirror_request_body off | 0.6.18 |
| CVE-2026-113425 | Mail proxy use-after-free | A mail proxy with proxy on and auth_http | 0.5.33 |
All are fixed in 1.30.7 and 1.31.9. The same release also fixes a TLS 1.3 request-body infinite loop (CVE-2026-118899, rated major by nginx.org), a stream SNI client-certificate bypass and minor issues (three on 1.31.9, two on 1.30.7), so the upgrade is worth taking even on a config that dodges the table above.
NGINX Plus is fixed in 37.0.8.1 and 37.3.0.1. Rapid7 lists R34 to R36 as affected with no fixed build.
Am I affected?
# 1. Version on a host or in a container
nginx -v
# 2. Which of the five can reach you? Dump the effective config and grep.
nginx -T 2>/dev/null | grep -nE 'listen[^;]*(http2|quic)|^\s*http[23] on|^\s*resolver |^\s*mirror |proxy_pass[^;]*\$|^\s*mail\s*\{'
# 3. Every NGINX-based image running in the cluster
kubectl get pods -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{range .spec.containers[*]}{.image}{"\n"}{end}{end}' \
| grep -Ei 'nginx' | sort | uniq -c
# 4. Is the retired ingress-nginx controller among them, and is HTTP/2 on?
kubectl get pods -A -l app.kubernetes.io/name=ingress-nginx,app.kubernetes.io/component=controller \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}/{.metadata.name} {.spec.containers[0].image}{"\n"}{end}'
kubectl get cm -A -l app.kubernetes.io/name=ingress-nginx,app.kubernetes.io/component=controller -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name} use-http2={.data.use-http2}{"\n"}{end}'
# 5. Signs of attempts: workers dying on a signal
grep -E 'worker process [0-9]+ exited on signal' /var/log/nginx/error.log
Check 2 maps straight onto the table: an http2 hit means CVE-2026-123007, http3/quic means CVE-2026-121810, a proxy_pass with a $ variable next to a resolver and a mirror means CVE-2026-123634. An empty use-http2= in check 4 means the key is unset, and ingress-nginx defaults it to "true". CERT-EU flags check 5 as an indicator of attempts, not proof of code execution.
Distribution packages are a separate question. Ubuntu and Debian ship older NGINX versions and may backport fixes, so nginx -v alone does not tell you whether a distro build is patched. Read your distro's security tracker for the package version.
The ingress-nginx problem
The community kubernetes/ingress-nginx controller was archived after its retirement in March 2026, and its README is explicit: no further releases, bugfixes or security updates. Its final controller release, v1.15.1, is built against NGINX 1.27.1, which sits inside the vulnerable ranges for both HTTP/2 CVEs, and its use-http2 setting defaults to on.
That leaves two moves. The stopgap is to turn HTTP/2 off at the controller:
# ingress-nginx-controller ConfigMap (name and namespace per your install)
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: ingress-nginx-controller
namespace: ingress-nginx
data:
use-http2: "false"
Clients fall back to HTTP/1.1, which costs some latency on pages with many assets, and Xint warns that services requiring HTTP/2, such as native gRPC, will be affected. The real fix is migrating off it. F5's NGINX Ingress Controller v5.8.0 and NGINX Gateway Fabric v2.9.0, both released November 18, build against NGINX 1.31.9 per their Dockerfiles. Our guide to moving from Ingress to Gateway API without downtime covers running both edges side by side while you shift traffic.
The stopgap for plain NGINX
On 1.25.1 and later, add http2 off; to each affected server block and drop any legacy http2 parameter from its listen lines. On older versions, remove http2 from the listen lines. Then nginx -t && nginx -s reload. Per CERT-EU, this covers CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 only. The other three need their own changes: drop QUIC listeners for CVE-2026-121810, point proxy_pass at a fixed upstream block instead of a variable for CVE-2026-123634, and restrict mail-proxy listeners to trusted networks for CVE-2026-113425.
Where this breaks
Rapid7's exploit needs about 128 GB of HTTP/2 traffic in one connection, roughly 17 minutes at 1 Gbit/s. It also depends on a glibc memcpy variant chosen on CPUs with AVX-512F and AVX-512VL. That raises the bar but does not close it: Rapid7 says other strategies may be viable, though none are known yet, and a CDN or load balancer in front only helps if it terminates HTTP/2 itself. Xint also describes chaining these bugs with a Linux kernel SCTP flaw to reach root on the host, so a containerized NGINX is not a full boundary. And a reload alone is not enough after an upgrade: restart the binary, or old workers keep running vulnerable code.
Questions people ask
Which NGINX versions fix CVE-2026-123007?
NGINX Open Source 1.30.7 (stable) and 1.31.9 (mainline), released November 18, 2026, fix all five headline CVEs. NGINX Plus is fixed in 37.0.8.1 and 37.3.0.1. Every open source release from 1.9.5 through 1.31.8 is affected. Distribution packages may carry backported fixes under an older version number, so check your distro's advisory.
Does disabling HTTP/2 fully protect NGINX?
No. It blocks CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633, the two HTTP/2 bugs. The HTTP/3, resolver and mail-proxy use-after-free bugs and the TLS 1.3 body-reading loop are untouched by it. Use http2 off; as a bridge to the upgrade.
Will ingress-nginx get a patch for nginx2root?
Not from the Kubernetes project. ingress-nginx was retired in March 2026 and its repository is archived. The last release, v1.15.1, bundles NGINX 1.27.1. Set use-http2: "false" in the controller ConfigMap now and plan a migration to a maintained controller or a Gateway API implementation.
The call we'd make
Patch every internet-facing NGINX to 1.30.7 or 1.31.9 this week, and set http2 off; today wherever that slips. For ingress-nginx, flip use-http2 off now and put the migration on this quarter's plan, because this will not be the last NGINX CVE it never receives. The caveat: the stopgap only covers the two HTTP/2 bugs, so run check 2 to see which other three your config reaches.
Sources
Cite this article
Kiril Urbonas (2026). NGINX CVE-2026-123007: An HTTP/2 RCE Back to 1.9.5. Patch to 1.30.7, and Retired ingress-nginx Gets No Fix. DevOpsNess. https://www.devopsness.com/blog/nginx-cve-2026-123007-http2-rce-ingress-nginx
[NGINX CVE-2026-123007: An HTTP/2 RCE Back to 1.9.5. Patch to 1.30.7, and Retired ingress-nginx Gets No Fix](https://www.devopsness.com/blog/nginx-cve-2026-123007-http2-rce-ingress-nginx) (Kiril Urbonas, DevOpsNess, 2026-11-19)
More from DevOps
Explore more articles in this category
Terraform vs Pulumi: HCL vs Real Code
Terraform's declarative HCL and Pulumi's real programming languages solve the same problem in very different ways, and the right pick depends on your team.
Distroless Docker Images: Smaller, Safer Production Containers
Our node image shipped 240 CVEs, most from OS packages we never called. Moving to distroless dropped the count to single digits and cut image size by 70%.
Threat Modeling for Engineers: A Practical Guide
A lightweight, whiteboard-friendly way to find design-level security flaws that scanners miss, using STRIDE, data-flow diagrams, and four plain questions.
You might have missed
Evergreen posts worth revisiting.